1.
Kyle Denney, A. Selcuk Uluagac, Hidayet Aksu, Kemal Akkaya
An Android-Based Covert Channel Framework on Wearables Using Status Bar Notifications Journal Article
2018.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Covert channels, Network Security, Wearables
@article{Denney2018AndroidCoverCh,
title = {An Android-Based Covert Channel Framework on Wearables Using Status Bar Notifications},
author = {Kyle Denney and A. Selcuk Uluagac and Hidayet Aksu and Kemal Akkaya},
editor = {Springer International Journal},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97643-3_1},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
urldate = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Springer International Publishing journal},
abstract = {Covert channels circumvent security measures to steal sensitive data undetectable to an onlooker. Traditionally, covert channels utilize global system resources or settings to send hidden messages. This chapter introduces covert channels and focuses on a novel covert channel on Android-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Particularly, we were able to make a covert channel using notifications a user gets from everyday applications. The chapter will also present this covert channel by discussing the framework, evaluating the performance, and demonstrating the functionality and flexibility of the proposed model.},
keywords = {Covert channels, Network Security, Wearables},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Covert channels circumvent security measures to steal sensitive data undetectable to an onlooker. Traditionally, covert channels utilize global system resources or settings to send hidden messages. This chapter introduces covert channels and focuses on a novel covert channel on Android-based Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Particularly, we were able to make a covert channel using notifications a user gets from everyday applications. The chapter will also present this covert channel by discussing the framework, evaluating the performance, and demonstrating the functionality and flexibility of the proposed model.
2.
Sakthi V. Radhakrishnan, A. Selcuk Uluagac, Raheem Beyah
Realizing an 802.11-based covert timing channel using off-the-shelf wireless cards Conference Paper
In the proceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2013.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Covert channels, Network Security
@conference{RadhakrishnanRealizingIEEE2013,
title = {Realizing an 802.11-based covert timing channel using off-the-shelf wireless cards},
author = {Sakthi V. Radhakrishnan and A. Selcuk Uluagac and Raheem Beyah},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6831158/},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
booktitle = {In the proceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)},
abstract = {By using covert channels, a malicious entity can hide messages within regular traffic and can thereby circumvent security mechanisms. This same method of obfuscation can be used by legitimate users to transmit messages over hostile networks. A promising area for covert channels is wireless networks employing carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) (e.g., 802.11 networks). These schemes introduce randomness in the network that provides good cover for a covert timing channel. Hence, by exploiting the random back-off in distributed coordination function (DCF) of 802.11, we realize a relatively high bandwidth covert timing channel for 802.11 networks, called Covert-DCF. As opposed to many works in the literature focusing on theory and simulations, Covert-DCF is the first fully implemented covert timing channel for 802.11 MAC using off-the-self wireless cards. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of Covert-DCF that is transparent to the users of the shared medium. We also evaluate the performance of Covert-DCF and provide discussions on the feasibility of this technique in a real world scenario.},
keywords = {Covert channels, Network Security},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}
By using covert channels, a malicious entity can hide messages within regular traffic and can thereby circumvent security mechanisms. This same method of obfuscation can be used by legitimate users to transmit messages over hostile networks. A promising area for covert channels is wireless networks employing carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) (e.g., 802.11 networks). These schemes introduce randomness in the network that provides good cover for a covert timing channel. Hence, by exploiting the random back-off in distributed coordination function (DCF) of 802.11, we realize a relatively high bandwidth covert timing channel for 802.11 networks, called Covert-DCF. As opposed to many works in the literature focusing on theory and simulations, Covert-DCF is the first fully implemented covert timing channel for 802.11 MAC using off-the-self wireless cards. In this paper, we introduce the design and implementation of Covert-DCF that is transparent to the users of the shared medium. We also evaluate the performance of Covert-DCF and provide discussions on the feasibility of this technique in a real world scenario.
Citations: 8413
h-index: 44
i10-index: 107
