1.
Venkatachalam Subramanian, A. Selcuk Uluagac, Hasan Cam, Raheem Beyah
Examining the characteristics and implications of sensor side channels Conference Paper
In the proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2013.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: CPS Security, Network Security, Side Channel
@conference{SubramanianIEEE2013,
title = {Examining the characteristics and implications of sensor side channels},
author = {Venkatachalam Subramanian, A. Selcuk Uluagac and Hasan Cam and Raheem Beyah},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6654855/},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
urldate = {2013-01-01},
booktitle = {In the proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)},
abstract = {The nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) utilize the radio frequency (RF) channel to communicate. Given that the RF channel is the primary communication channel, many researchers have developed techniques for securing that channel. However, the RF channel is not the only interface into a sensor. The sensing components, which are primarily designed to sense characteristics about the outside world, can also be used (or misused) as a communication (side) channel. In this paper, we characterize the side channels for various sensory components (i.e., light sensor, acoustic sensor, and accelerometer). While previous work has focused on the use of these side channels to improve the security and performance of a WSN, we seek to determine if the side channels have enough capacity to potentially be used for malicious activity. Specifically, we evaluate the feasibility and practicality of the side channels using today's sensor technology and illustrate that these channels have enough capacity to enable the transfer of common, well-known malware. The ultimate goal of this work is to illustrate the need for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that not only monitor the RF channel, but also monitor the values returned by the sensory components.},
keywords = {CPS Security, Network Security, Side Channel},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}
The nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) utilize the radio frequency (RF) channel to communicate. Given that the RF channel is the primary communication channel, many researchers have developed techniques for securing that channel. However, the RF channel is not the only interface into a sensor. The sensing components, which are primarily designed to sense characteristics about the outside world, can also be used (or misused) as a communication (side) channel. In this paper, we characterize the side channels for various sensory components (i.e., light sensor, acoustic sensor, and accelerometer). While previous work has focused on the use of these side channels to improve the security and performance of a WSN, we seek to determine if the side channels have enough capacity to potentially be used for malicious activity. Specifically, we evaluate the feasibility and practicality of the side channels using today's sensor technology and illustrate that these channels have enough capacity to enable the transfer of common, well-known malware. The ultimate goal of this work is to illustrate the need for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that not only monitor the RF channel, but also monitor the values returned by the sensory components.
Citations: 8413
h-index: 44
i10-index: 107
