Publications

@conference{9842711,

title = {A Literature Review on Blockchain-enabled Security and Operation of Cyber-Physical Systems},

author = {Alvi Ataur Khalil and Javier Franco and Imtiaz Parvez and Selcuk Uluagac and Hossain Shahriar and Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman},

url = {https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2021arXiv210707916A/abstract},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-01-01},

urldate = {2022-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of  46th Annual Computers, Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)},

abstract = {Blockchain has become a key technology in a plethora of application domains owing to its decentralized public nature. The cyber-physical systems (CPS) is one of the prominent application domains that leverage blockchain for myriad operations, where the Internet of Things (IoT) is utilized for data collection. Although some of the CPS problems can be solved by simply adopting blockchain for its secure and distributed nature, others require complex considerations for overcoming blockchain-imposed limitations while maintaining the core aspect of CPS. Even though a number of studies focus on either the utilization of blockchains for different CPS applications or the blockchain-enabled security of CPS, there is no comprehensive survey including both perspectives together. To fill this gap, we present a comprehensive overview of contemporary advancement in using blockchain for enhancing different CPS.},

keywords = {Blockchain Security, CPS Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{rondon2020poisonivy,

title = {PoisonIvy: (In) secure Practices of Enterprise IoT Systems in Smart Buildings},

author = {Luis Puche Rondon and Leonardo Babun and Ahmet Aris and Kemal Akkaya and A Selcuk Uluagac},

url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3408308.3427606},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-01-01},

urldate = {2020-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of the 7th ACM International Conference on Systems for Energy-Efficient Buildings, Cities, and Transportation},

pages = {130–139},

abstract = {The rise of IoT devices has led to the proliferation of smart buildings, offices, and homes worldwide. Although commodity IoT devices are employed by ordinary end-users, complex environments such as smart buildings, government, or private smart offices, conference rooms, or hospitality require customized and highly reliable solutions. Those systems called Enterprise Internet of Things (EIoT) connect such environments to the Internet and are professionally managed solutions usually offered by dedicated vendors (e.g., Control4, Crestron, Lutron, etc.). As EIoT systems require specialized training, software, and equipment to deploy, many of these systems are closed-source and proprietary in nature. This has led to very little research investigating the security of EIoT systems and their components. },

keywords = {CPS Security, IoT Security, Smart Home Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{Naseem2019CSPoweR,

title = {CSPoweR-Watch: A Cyber-Resilient Residential Power Management System},

author = {Faraz Naseem and Leonardo Babun and Cengiz Kaygusuz and S. J. Moquin and Chris Farnell and Alan Mantooth and A. Selcuk Uluagac},

url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8875295/},

year  = {2019},

date = {2019-01-01},

urldate = {2019-01-01},

publisher = {In the proceedings of the International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData)},

abstract = {Modern Energy Management Systems (EMS) are becoming increasingly complex in order to address the urgent issue of global energy consumption. These systems retrieve vital information from various Internet-connected resources in a smart grid to function effectively. However, relying on such resources results in them being susceptible to cyber attacks. Malicious actors can exploit the interconnections between the resources to perform nefarious tasks such as modifying critical firmware, sending bogus sensor data, or stealing sensitive information. To address this issue, we propose a novel framework that integrates PowerWatch, a solution that detects compromised devices in the smart grid with Cyber-secure Power Router (CSPR), a smart energy management system. The goal is to ascertain whether or not such a device has operated maliciously. To achieve this, PowerWatch utilizes a machine learning model that analyzes information from system and library call lists extracted from CSPR in order to detect malicious activity in the EMS. To test the efficacy of our framework, a number of unique attack scenarios were performed on a realistic testbed that comprises functional versions of CSPR and PowerWatch to monitor the electrical environment for suspicious activity. Our performance evaluation investigates the effectiveness of this first-of-its-kind merger and provides insight into the feasibility of developing future cybersecure EMS. The results of our experimental procedures yielded 100% accuracy for each of the attack scenarios. Finally, our implementation demonstrates that the integration of PowerWatch and CSPR is effective and yields minimal overhead to the EMS.},

keywords = {CPS Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{VattapparambanDronesIWCMC,

title = {Drones for smart cities: Issues in cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety},

author = {Edwin Vattapparamban and Ismail Güvenç and Ali I Yurekli and Kemal Akkaya and Selçuk Uluağaç},

url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7577060},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-01-01},

urldate = {2016-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of the International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC)},

abstract = {It is expected that drones will take a major role in the connected smart cities of the future. They will be delivering goods and merchandise, serving as mobile hot spots for broadband wireless access, and maintaining surveillance and security of smart cities. However, pervasive use of drones for future smart cities also brings together several technical and societal concerns and challenges that needs to be addressed, including in the areas of cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety. Drones, while can be used for the betterment of the society, can also be used by malicious entities to conduct physical and cyber attacks, and threaten the society. The goal of this survey paper is to review various aspects of drones in future smart cities, relating to cybersecurity, privacy, and public safety. We will also provide representative results on cyber attacks using drones.},

keywords = {CPS Security, UAV Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{TonyaliHomomorphiCCNC,

title = {A reliable data aggregation mechanism with Homomorphic Encryption in Smart Grid AMI networks},

author = {Samet Tonyali and Kemal Akkaya and Nico Saputro and A. Selcuk Uluagac},

url = {https://csl.fiu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/reliable_data_tonyali.pdf},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-01-01},

urldate = {2016-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC)},

abstract = {One of the most common methods to preserve consumers' private data is using secure in-network data aggregation. The security can be provided through the emerging fully (FHE) or partial (PHE) homomorphic encryption techniques. However, an FHE aggregation scheme generates significantly big-size data when compared to traditional encryption methods. The overhead is compounded in hierarchical networks such as Smart Grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) as data packets are routed towards the core of the AMI networking infrastructure from the smart meters. In this paper, we first investigate the feasibility and performance of FHE aggregation in AMI networks utilizing the reliable data transport protocol, TCP. Then, we introduce the packet reassembly problem. To address this challenge, we propose a novel packet reassembly mechanism for TCP. We evaluated the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism using both PHE and FHE-based aggregation approaches in AMI in terms throughput and end-to-end delay on an 802.11s-based wireless mesh network by using the ns-3 network simulator. The results indicate significant gains in terms of delay and bandwidth usage with the proposed mechanism.},

keywords = {CPS Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{BabunSmartGridIEEECNS,

title = {A framework for counterfeit smart grid device detection},

author = {Leonardo Babun and Hidayet Aksu and A. Selcuk Uluagac},

url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7860522},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-01-01},

urldate = {2016-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)},

abstract = {The core vision of the smart grid concept is the realization of reliable two-way communications between smart devices (e.g., IEDs, PLCs, PMUs). The benefits of the smart grid also come with tremendous security risks and new challenges in protecting the smart grid systems from cyber threats. Particularly, the use of untrusted counterfeit smart grid devices represents a real problem. Consequences of propagating false or malicious data, as well as stealing valuable user or smart grid state information from counterfeit devices are costly. Hence, early detection of counterfeit devices is critical for protecting smart grid's components and users. To address these concerns, in this poster, we introduce our initial design of a configurable framework that utilize system call tracing, library interposition, and statistical techniques for monitoring and detection of counterfeit smart grid devices. In our framework, we consider realistic counterfeit device scenarios with different smart grid devices and adversarial settings. Our initial results on a realistic testbed utilizing actual smart-grid GOOSE messages with IEC-61850 communication protocol are very promising. Our framework is showing excellent rates on detection of smart grid counterfeit devices from impostors.},

keywords = {CPS Security, Fingerprinting},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{UluagacSensoryIEEE,

title = {Sensory channel threats to Cyber Physical Systems: A wake-up call},

author = {A. Selcuk Uluagac and Venkatachalam Subramanian and Raheem Beyah},

url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6997498},

year  = {2014},

date = {2014-01-01},

urldate = {2014-01-01},

booktitle = {In the Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security},

abstract = {Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is a relatively novel computing paradigm where there is a tight integration of communications, computation, and the physical environment. An important component of the CPS devices is the sensors they use to interact with each other and the physical world around them. With CPS applications, engineers monitor the structural health of highways and bridges, farmers check the health of their crops, and ecologists observe wildlife in their natural habitat. Nonetheless, current security models consider protecting only networking components of the CPS devices utilizing traditional security mechanisms (e.g., an intrusion detection system for the data that traverse the network protocol stacks). The protection mechanisms are not sufficient to protect CPS devices from threats emanating from sensory channels. Using sensory channels (e.g., light, temperature, infrared), an adversary can successfully attack systems. Specifically, the adversary can (1) trigger existing malware, (2) transfer malware, or (3) combine malicious use of different sensory channels to increase the impact of the attack on CPS devices. In this work, we focus on these novel sensory channel threats to CPS devices and applications. We first note how sensory channel threats are an emerging area for the CPS world. Then, we analyze the performance various sensory channel threats. Moreover, using an iRobot Create as our CPS platform, we exploit simple vulnerable programs on iRobot through its infrared channel. Finally, we introduce the design of a novel sensory channel aware intrusion detection system as a protection mechanism against the sensory channel threats for CPS devices.},

keywords = {CPS Security},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}

@conference{SubramanianIEEE2013,

title = {Examining the characteristics and implications of sensor side channels},

author = {Venkatachalam Subramanian, A. Selcuk Uluagac and Hasan Cam and Raheem Beyah},

url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6654855/},

year  = {2013},

date = {2013-01-01},

urldate = {2013-01-01},

booktitle = {In the proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)},

abstract = {The nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) utilize the radio frequency (RF) channel to communicate. Given that the RF channel is the primary communication channel, many researchers have developed techniques for securing that channel. However, the RF channel is not the only interface into a sensor. The sensing components, which are primarily designed to sense characteristics about the outside world, can also be used (or misused) as a communication (side) channel. In this paper, we characterize the side channels for various sensory components (i.e., light sensor, acoustic sensor, and accelerometer). While previous work has focused on the use of these side channels to improve the security and performance of a WSN, we seek to determine if the side channels have enough capacity to potentially be used for malicious activity. Specifically, we evaluate the feasibility and practicality of the side channels using today's sensor technology and illustrate that these channels have enough capacity to enable the transfer of common, well-known malware. The ultimate goal of this work is to illustrate the need for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that not only monitor the RF channel, but also monitor the values returned by the sensory components.},

keywords = {CPS Security, Network Security, Side Channel},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {conference}

}